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Civil Right to Counsel: In re Marriage of King
and the Continuing Journey
Deborah Perluss1
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2007, the Washington Supreme Court decided the case of In
re Marriage of King.2 The case held that the state does not need to provide
an indigent parent with counsel at public expense in judicial proceedings
that threaten her parent-child relationship—more specifically, an attorney
need not represent a mother before a court can remove her as the primary
caregiver of her three children. The Washington Supreme Court arrived at
this conclusion, even though the mother faced a grossly uneven playing
field due to her limited education, her incapacity to present an effective
case, and the father having the benefit of counsel. How and why the court
arrived at this conclusion is worth some examination, both to gain insight
into the contextual aspects of judicial decision-making and to inform
strategies for enforcing constitutional rights in general and, in particular, the
right to counsel in noncriminal cases.
This article examines the King decision in light of the substantiated need
for indigent representation, the right to counsel jurisprudence in
noncriminal cases in Washington, and with reference to the national
movement in support of defined rights to counsel in certain compelling civil
cases. The article also discusses recent research of the effects on individuals
and courts when litigants are unrepresented, and it identifies circumstances
in which judicially-established rights to counsel may still be achieved in
Washington following King. Finally, this article examines the King decision
in order to arrive at some understanding of how a supreme court, which is
viewed as a leader in the cause of equal justice, could fail to be persuaded
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by the contextual injustice that occurred in this case—one that is not an
isolated occurrence in Washington courts.
First, I will briefly define the problem that is discussed in this article by
referring to the overwhelming need for legal aid in Washington and some
recent efforts in response to the problem. Then, I will briefly discuss the
history and status of when Washington requires the provision of counsel for
individuals in noncriminal cases. This is followed by a description of what
happens to unrepresented individuals in courts to demonstrate that the
issues being discussed have real day-to-day impacts for both litigants and
the courts. This, hopefully, sets the stage for a discussion of the issues and
the decision in King, followed by a discussion of recent research on
whether, as a practical matter, lawyer representation has an impact on the
outcome of a noncriminal case. Finally, I will discuss post-King
developments and continuing efforts in Washington and nationally to
advance access to justice for all persons through advocacy that promotes the
right to counsel in cases that impact basic human needs and significantly
affect the daily lives of individuals.
While this article necessarily discusses these issues with citation to cases,
data, and other resources; the subjective arguments and speculative
assertions are derived from insights, perceptions, and impressions gained
from a thirty-year career as a civil legal aid attorney in Washington. Over
the course of my career, I have witnessed or known of innumerable
unrepresented individuals who have experienced unfair results in courts
solely because a lawyer was not present to help tell their story coherently,
bring out the relevant facts of their case, make a persuasive presentation,
and/or inform the judge of applicable law.3

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND COMPELLING A RESPONSE
The need for help with noncriminal legal problems in Washington is high
and mirrors the need nationally.4 Certainly, legal aid programs cannot
represent all low-income persons needing a lawyer in civil litigation.5
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Indeed, every year thousands of individuals appear in Washington courts
without a lawyer.6 The consequences for low-income persons (who are
forced to confront legal problems that are legislatively consigned to the
courts for resolution) are even more pronounced because their legal issues
often involve basic human needs such as housing, sustenance, and
protection from family violence.7 In many cases, one party is represented by
a lawyer, while the other is not.8 In a high percentage of these cases, the
unrepresented party loses on meritorious causes or forfeits rights that are
before the court.9 In addition, unrepresented litigants often fail to exercise
procedural rights that would benefit their cause or give them a strategic
advantage, if they only knew about the procedural right or how to raise it.10
As a result, a significant number of decisions are rendered each year by
judges without full knowledge of the facts or consideration of the law that
applies to a particular case.11 The resulting outcomes are sometimes merely
erroneous, but often they are life-changing and, occasionally, even tragic.
In response to this problem, the American Bar Association (ABA)
spearheaded a national movement12 to consider whether, in certain
noncriminal cases, the issues for litigants are so fundamental or critical to
their lives and well-being that governments ought to be providing those
litigants with lawyers as a matter of right when faced with adversarial
judicial proceedings. In 2006, the ABA’s policy-making House of
Delegates unanimously approved Report and Recommendation No. 112A,
adopting the Report as official ABA policy for the right to counsel in noncriminal proceedings.13 The policy statement urges “federal, state, and
territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public
expense to low-income persons in those categories of proceedings where
basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance,
safety, health, or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.”14
Following the adoption of this brief policy statement, an ABA Presidential
Task Force developed a statement of principles expanding on the
concepts.15 The principles are accompanied by a proposed Model Act to
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assist jurisdictions with implementing the civil right to counsel with a
workable structure.16 Both of these initiatives were adopted as official ABA
policy at the August 2010 meeting of the House of Delegates.17

III. CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON
In Washington State, the equal justice community has long focused on
efforts to expand the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Early cases
established a right to counsel for parents in a few specific circumstances,
such as juvenile court proceedings where the state sought to impair or
terminate parental rights,18 when a private civil contempt proceeding could
result in the imprisonment of a party,19 and when the competency of a
lawyer is at issue in disciplinary proceedings that could impair their ability
to practice law.20 More recently, courts have held that counsel must be
provided to a child in truancy hearings21 and to protect parental rights in a
nonparental custody proceeding that flows from a permanency plan process
for a child who is a dependent ward of the juvenile court.22
Washington also affords a civil right to counsel by statute in limited
circumstances.23 Washington provides a discretionary right to counsel for
petitioners who seek a sexual assault protection order if the respondent
appears with counsel,24 as well as for a child over the age of twelve in a
dependency proceeding.25 In 2007, the Washington Supreme Court also
adopted a general court rule, GR 33, which affords the opportunity for
indigent persons with disabilities to seek appointment of counsel when
needed, as a reasonable accommodation to ensure meaningful access to the
justice system.26
Despite the expansion of the above-established rights to counsel in civil
proceedings, Washington courts have still not extended rights to counsel
when judicial proceedings have threatened a party’s basic needs. These
include proceedings to evict one from rental housing,27 to obtain economic
governmental benefits,28 and most recently, to protect parental rights in a
private custody/parenting plan proceeding as between two parents.29
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As discussed below, there are cases currently pending in the Washington
courts that will address the right to counsel in other civil contexts post-King.
In addition to Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S.30—which involves the right to
counsel for children in truancy fact-finding proceedings—another case, In
re A.R./D.R., will address a child’s right to counsel in a parental rights
termination proceeding in juvenile court.31 In both of these cases, the trial
courts had not provided counsel to children, resulting in their loss of rights
to education and familial relations.
In all of these cases, as in King, the unrepresented parties faced a
significant imbalance of power in the judicial process, with either the
superior power of the state, school district, or an otherwise represented
opposing party proceeding against them. The imbalance of power is not and
cannot be cured by judges who struggle in such cases to accommodate the
unskilled litigants and are often frustrated by their inability to proceed
according to the formal rules and expectations of the adversarial process.32
Regardless of this frustration, how could a supreme court, which is
viewed as a national leader in the cause of equal justice, fail to be persuaded
by the contextual injustice that occurred in the King case—one that is not an
isolated occurrence in Washington courts? A careful reading of King’s
majority decision leaves one to infer that the judiciary is institutionally
constrained to grant remedies that challenge the basic assumption that all
litigants get justice in court, even though the structure of the judicial system
itself is a barrier to justice.

IV. JUDICIAL INADEQUACIES FACING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS
Following the adoption of the ABA policy resolution in 2006, the
Washington Supreme Court was the first state high court to have the
opportunity to take up the ABA’s call in the case of In re Marriage of
King.33 Brenda King, an indigent mother of three with limited education and
few resources, was the unrepresented parent and appellant who asked the
court to provide her a lawyer to help her protect her interest in remaining
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the primary residential parent of her three young children.34 Because Brenda
King could not get an attorney to represent her in her fight to keep primary
residential care of her children, which culminated in a five-day trial, she
was forced to advocate on her own behalf.35 During the trial, Brenda King
struggled to present and challenge evidence and to examine witnesses,
including herself, her estranged husband, and a hostile guardian ad litem
(GAL) for the children. Additionally, she found it difficult to make coherent
legal arguments while trying to maintain a level of physical and emotional
stamina needed to address the most basic and personal aspects of her life. In
contrast, her husband had a lawyer representing him throughout the
proceedings.
Needless to say, Brenda King lost her battle, leaving her to lament in the
final hours of the case, “I am a good mother, I am a lousy lawyer!”36 The
observation is all the more prescient given the postdecision events in the
case. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to grant primary residential care of the children to Mr. King.
Subsequently, Brenda King returned to court, this time with a lawyer who
agreed to take her case on a pro bono basis, and petitioned to modify the
parenting plan so as to return primary custody of the children to her.37 In
July 2008, a Final Parenting Plan was entered that returned the children to
her primary residential care.38
Indeed, when the trial judge denied Brenda King’s request for a new trial
and appointment of counsel, he acknowledged that “[Mrs. King] was at a
significant disadvantage through her inability to retain counsel to represent
her at trial and her inability to secure pro bono representation, despite her
requests for such representation, which circumstances mirror the access to
justice crisis throughout the State.”39 The trial judge further observed:
[C]andidly I agree . . . insofar as . . . Mrs. King not being well
served because she was pro se. I think the record will bear that out.
That she had a very difficult time at trial, that there were objections
that she was unfamiliar with, [and that she] did not respond.
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Evidence that she apparently had consisting, I think, in some cases,
of police reports that didn’t see the light of day because there were
proper objections based on hearsay. And she didn’t know enough
about the rules to secure the presence of a witness to testify to what
facts she thought might have been relevant. And I think in the
materials that you submitted, you’ve also pointed out from the
daycare or the school, rather, some information that did come in to
evidence because it appears there was no objection. And some of
that information was hearsay and may have been inaccurate, which
is why we have hearsay objections, which Mrs. King did not raise
at trial or I would have sustained an objection and kept some of
that evidence out.40
In a passionate and compelling dissent to King’s majority opinion, Justice
(now Chief Justice) Madsen said that she viewed this demonstration of
judicial inadequacy as the basis for why counsel should be provided as of
right in such cases.41 As she so eloquently stated, “Ms. King’s struggle to
represent herself in this case demonstrates the legal hurdles that arise every
day in courtrooms across Washington, showing the importance of counsel
to a parent in a dissolution proceeding seeking to secure her fundamental
right to parent her children.”42
One need only refer to Justice Madsen’s dissenting opinion to get a flavor
of the disadvantaged environment in which Brenda King found herself, and
as a result, the skewed lens through which the trial judge ultimately viewed
the case. The facts are recounted in detail and need not be repeated here.43 It
is sufficient to quote Justice Madsen’s indisputable conclusion:
As the facts show, Ms. King lacked even a high school education,
much less the education and training necessary to be a lawyer. She
was unable to present her case effectively because she could not
master the rules of evidence and she was unable to prevent
admission of evidence that a lawyer would have been able to keep
out. Ms. King was unable to match the skill of opposing counsel.
Her emotions adversely affected her performance, and the record
makes it clear that by the end of trial she had exhausted the court’s
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patience. The trial judge frankly acknowledged that Ms. King’s
self-representation had been inadequate.44
Thus, the question to address is: why against the facts and circumstances
present in the King case, when it was clear that the Brenda King was
significantly disadvantaged by the absence of a lawyer (even to the point
that the trial judge himself acknowledged the adverse impact on his decision
making), did a majority of the Washington Supreme Court not see fit to find
any legal basis upon which Brenda King should have been provided counsel
as a matter of right? An increasing body of research substantiates that the
absence of representation for civil litigants in adversarial proceedings
negatively impacts the judge’s decision-making, the outcome, and calls into
question the basic fairness and integrity of the judicial process.45 A ruling
that indigent persons in civil proceedings have a right to representation by
competent counsel could be viewed as implicitly challenging the court
system’s image as a “just” process. Such a ruling would test the validity of
judges as neutral fact-finders and purveyors of justice without regard to the
status of the parties coming before them. It would also require some selfreflection and acknowledgement of the potential for bias within the judicial
system, which may have been unpalatable for a court recognized as a leader
on equal access to justice.

V. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL IN KING
Importantly, Brenda King pursued her request for appointed counsel even
after having lost primary custody in a five-day trial, demonstrating a record
replete with examples of her ineffectiveness, yet with no apparent legal
error that she could easily point to in the court’s decision on the merits.
Thus, the only issue presented to the court for consideration on appeal was
whether, in the context of a highly adversarial, high-stakes custody dispute
in which one parent is represented by counsel and the other is not, does she,
the unrepresented parent, have a constitutional right to appointed counsel.46
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Certainly, Brenda King was well-represented in the appeal by highly
competent pro bono counsel, and the cause was supported by respected
amicus curiae.47 One can speculate that the potential cost of counsel was the
sole concern that influenced the court. However, because the U.S. Supreme
Court has frequently ruled that cost alone cannot be a factor in considering
what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment,48 and the
Washington Supreme Court has not shied away from rendering decisions
that result in significant additional cost to the state budget,49 one cannot
assume that cost alone was the impetus for the court’s decision.
Nevertheless, cost was a focus of the briefs submitted by amicus curiae
against Brenda King’s claim for counsel, which effectively made it an issue
for the court.50 Without directly arguing the cost point, both the amici
attorney general and the legislature characterized the right sought as
“taxpayer-paid counsel in a civil case.”51 The Association of Counties more
accurately defined the right sought as not merely access to the courts, but as
the right to “litigate effectively once in court,”52 and directly cited the
limited budget available to fund competing human needs in support of its
argument to deny the right.53 However, other amici, in particular the Retired
Washington Judges, focused their brief on the costs to the judicial system
and to society at large of failing to provide counsel for unrepresented
litigants in adversarial proceedings. Such costs include the time-consuming
nature of dealing with unskilled litigants, the inefficiencies involved in
multiple exchanges regarding sufficiency of evidence, lack of compliance
with evidentiary rules and process, delayed proceedings due to improper
paper work, costs to the integrity of the decision making process, and an
impaired trust and confidence in the courts.54 Although the judicial system
is greatly affected by such inefficiencies, indigent individuals bear the
ultimate costs resulting from wrong or inappropriate decisions flowing from
the lack of adequate information.
In contrast to the above characterizations of the issue before the court,
Brenda King defined the right she sought as “meaningful access to the
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court.”55 Supportive amici variously characterized the right at issue as a
right to appointment of counsel when:





a litigant is “facing the loss of basic human needs”56 (focusing on
the relevant need or interest as critical);
the “absence of representation” for the particular litigant leaves the
proceedings “constitutionally deficient”57 (suggesting that a caseby-case determination should occur with respect to the abilities of
the particular litigant and the complexity of the proceeding); or
the right to a “fair trial” cannot be met otherwise58 (advocating a
broad general right to counsel in civil litigation as a matter of
fairness).

Hence, while the issues were joined, the court had a number of options it
could have chosen for how to analyze the right and could have found a
broad right or, more realistically, limited its scope in any number of ways to
the specific facts of the King case (such as disputed custody, the primary
parent’s lack of representation, and the other parent’s representation) or to
the category of disputed child custody cases, as determined on a case-bycase basis.
The court had a recent history of not only understanding the cause of
access to the civil justice system but also a commitment to it,59 and there
was hope that the court would be sympathetic. In a recent decision, the
Washington Supreme Court justices had commented on the potential need
for courts to appoint lawyers for children in private custody disputes.60 The
confluence of circumstances suggested that, if ever there was a time and
case to further expand the civil right to counsel beyond the narrow scope of
state-initiated deprivation of parental rights (Myricks61/Luscier62) and
physical incarceration cases (Tetro63), this was the time, and King was the
case.
As it turned out, external events occurred that could not have been
anticipated when Brenda King filed her appeal in early 2006. The case was
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argued in May 2007 and the court issued its decision on December 6, 2007,
just before the beginning of the 2008 legislative session. During the earlier
2007 session, the legislature had responded to the justice crisis and the need
for increased funding (as championed by the court in their “Justice in
Jeopardy” initiative) by approving a significant increase in state funding for
civil legal aid over the 2007–2009 biennium.64 How much this played into
the justices’ reasoning is unknown. Even so, the additional state funds that
the legislature had made available earlier in the year would not be enough to
address the need for representation in disputed custody cases.
Neither would the funding have turned back the clock for Brenda King.
The ultimate decision in the case was 7–2 against any expansion of the right
to counsel,65 with only Justices Madsen and Chambers dissenting.66

VI. THE MAJORITY DECISION IN KING
As discussed above, the court had a number of options available to grant
Brenda King a new trial with appointed counsel without having to grant a
broad right to counsel and otherwise threaten the status quo. Instead, the
court chose a direct and calculated path that was more expansive than
necessary to deny her the opportunity for a new custody trial with appointed
counsel. In doing so, the court seemed to send a deliberate message
cautioning against new cases that sought further expansion of a civil right to
counsel. Nevertheless, as new cases continue to present this need in other
compelling circumstances, close analysis of the King decision may help the
cause of others who seek to advance the right.
The Washington Supreme Court’s antipathy toward Brenda King and her
cause is suggested by the conclusion reached, the language used, and the
unnecessarily broad scope of analysis. First, in contrast to the dissent’s
focus on the parental rights issues at stake, the majority characterized the
case strictly as a “dissolution”—a proceeding that historically carries a
negative connotation.67 Thus, from the outset, the majority framed the
question as follows: “This case involves the issue of whether an indigent
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parent has a constitutional right, primarily under the Washington State
Constitution, to appointment of counsel at public expense in a dissolution
proceeding.”68 As such, the frame is less about the constitutionallyprotected, parent-child relationship and more about the re-ordering of an
estranged relationship, which is entitled to somewhat lesser protection
under Washington law.69 The majority described the impact of the trial
court’s ruling in terms that minimized the consequences for Brenda King
and her parent-child interests: “At the trial’s conclusion, the superior court
entered a parenting plan granting primary residential care of the children to
the father-respondent. The plan granted visitation rights to the petitionermother.”70
Second, in contrast to the dissenting opinion’s exhaustive recitation of the
facts, the majority devoted one short paragraph to the facts: the parties were
married (without any elaboration), Brenda King was the primary caregiver
of the children, the parties separated, and Mr. King sought to become the
primary residential parent.71 This was followed by a minimal statement of
what occurred at trial, essentially stating that Mr. King was represented at
trial, Brenda King was not, and the court ruled in his favor.72 Needless to
say, the majority did not address the contextual circumstances surrounding
Brenda King’s incapacity to present her case or the impact of her lack of
representation on the fairness of the process itself.
Instead, the majority rested on the “nature of the interest implicated” as
the guide to its constitutional analysis.73 How it defined the interest would
prove to be decisive. If an interest is defined as fundamental under existing
law, it is entitled to “constitutional significance” and the full panoply of due
process attaches, including appointed counsel at public expense.74 In this
case, even though the parent-child bond between Brenda King and her three
minor children was directly at stake and subject to an involuntary
interference by the state court, the majority framed the interest at stake and
the adversarial process involved as “effectuating a legislative purpose of
continued involvement in the children’s lives.”75 In other words, as
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portrayed, the state had done Brenda King a favor in providing her a means
and process through which to maintain a relationship with her children, so
why was she complaining?76 Thus, the majority deemed the issue to be
“fundamentally different” from the termination or impairment of parental
rights that occurs in state-initiated dependency proceedings.77 Hence, the
majority concluded that the “interest at stake” was not of sufficient
constitutional magnitude to warrant a right to counsel under existing
Myricks/Luscier case precedents.78
The majority supported its conclusion by asserting that Washington’s
parenting plan statutes provide numerous safeguards to protect parents from
“erroneous decisions.”79 In making this observation, the majority made no
reference whatsoever to the record of the case, which, as acknowledged by
the trial judge, was replete with opportunities for erroneous decision
making.80 Moreover, in most circumstances, these “safeguards” are illusory
for indigent, parenting plan litigants who lack the means to pay for the
resources authorized. Furthermore, as noted by the dissent and reflected in
the amicus curiae brief from Northwest Women’s Law Center (now Legal
Voice), the statutory “protection” for provision of a GAL contributes to the
complexity of the process for unrepresented litigants, who may not
understand the importance a GAL.81 Indeed, in this case, Brenda King had
to contend with a hostile GAL who recommended that the trial court place
the children with Mr. King.82 The other statutory “protections” cited by the
majority were either not utilized by the trial court or not available to Brenda
King, perhaps because she was not aware of them, did not know how to
access them, or did not have the funds to pay for them.
The majority could have ended its discussion at the point of finding that
due process protections under state and federal constitutional law do not
afford a private indigent litigant in a divorce case a right to counsel.
However, somewhat mixing the analysis of the constitutional claims related
to the parent-child relationship (which the majority said “are not implicated
in a dissolution proceeding”83) and Brenda King’s claim based on other
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state constitutional grounds, the court proceeded to analyze the other bases
for the claim, finding the interests “significant enough.”84
First, the majority analyzed and struck down Brenda King’s “meaningful
access to justice” claim. In addition to the due process protections of the
federal and state constitutions, Ms. King argued that appointment of an
attorney to represent her in the disputed custody proceeding was necessary
to enable her to have meaningful access to justice, a right guaranteed by
article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution.85 Even though
Washington law has long held that access to courts is a fundamental right
and courts have the inherent power to protect this right,86 the King majority
would limit courts’ inherent power to overcoming tangible barriers (e.g.,
physical facilities and court fees). In doing so, however, the court
unnecessarily took the opportunity to define the concept of “access to
courts” as merely a term of art that holds no “linguistic” meaning apart from
literal egress to the courthouse and through the threshold of the courtroom
door.87
Next, the majority went on to examine Brenda King’s claim for
appointed counsel under the Washington State Constitution’s due process
and privileges and immunities provisions.88 In applying the Washington
Supreme Court’s six-prong analytical framework set out in State v.
Gunwall89 (determining when a state constitutional provision is applied
more protectively than the comparable provision in the U.S. Constitution),
the King court could have justifiably found that the state constitution
afforded greater protection than the federal constitution for a civil litigant’s
appointment of counsel. The court did determine that, regarding the
structure of the state constitution, the primacy of family law as a state
interest, and the state history of providing counsel in dependency and
parental rights termination cases, the Washington State Constitution’s
article I, section 3 is more protective than Fourteenth Amendment due
process.90
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Nevertheless, the court refused to engage in the independent state
constitutional analysis. The rationale for not doing so was twofold: (1) no
other court has found a due process right to counsel in a custody context
and (2) no fundamental rights of Brenda King were at stake.91 Having
already dismissed the idea that parental rights in a private custody dispute
are fundamental, and having concluded “access to courts” does not
encompass overcoming intangible barriers posed by court structure and
process, the majority reiterated that a right to appointed counsel in child
custody proceedings did not arise under article I, section 3 of the
Washington State Constitution.92
It is hard to read much into the court’s apparent concern that it would be
an “outlier” among the states by providing counsel to indigent child custody
litigants at public expense. In fact, in 1979, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled
that when one parent is provided free representation in a custody proceeding
and the other parent is indigent and unrepresented, counsel must be
appointed at public expense.93 The Washington Supreme Court itself was an
early adopter of a parent’s right to counsel in termination and dependency
proceedings.94 The ABA policy statements on point and the Washington
State Bar Association’s amicus brief in King hardly suggest that the notion
lies in radical legal thinking.
The final basis rejected by the court for providing Brenda King with a
right to counsel was the privileges and immunities provision in article I,
section 12 of the Washington Constitution.95 Ms. King had argued that use
of the courts to resolve disputes is a privilege afforded by the state,96
although not equally available to persons without resources to hire an
attorney.97 The majority dispensed with the claim simply by characterizing
the case as involving a “purely private matter initiated by the parties,”98
without discussing the import of disparities in outcomes or the varying
quality of justice received as between the represented and the
unrepresented.99
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VII. DOES A LAWYER MATTER?
Although the majority failed to address the impact of having a lawyer on
the quality of justice received, the dissent did not shy away from this issue.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Madsen pointed to empirical studies that
demonstrate the differences in outcomes when litigants are represented and
when they are not. One study of custody proceedings found that attorneyrepresented mothers were twice as likely as pro se mothers to be awarded
full or joint custody when the opposing fathers were represented by
counsel.100 Another study, which focused on the early days following the
adoption of Washington’s Parenting Act,101 found that shared parenting
plans in King County were as much as 42 percent more likely to occur
where both parties were represented by counsel than in cases where one
party appeared pro se.102
In addition to the studies cited by Justice Madsen’s dissent, more recent
studies substantiate the earlier conclusions.103 For example, Stanford
researcher Rebecca Sandefur conducted a meta-analysis of several studies
across various disciplines and found that litigants who were represented by
lawyers were between 17 percent and 1,380 percent more likely to win,
with the largest differences in the outcomes between lawyer-represented
and unrepresented cases at every level of litigation.104 Sandefur reports that
unrepresented litigants “are often observed to make elementary errors, such
as failing to make an argument, to address the other side’s arguments, or to
bring to trial important pieces of evidence.”105 As further confirmation of
this observation, the ABA recently released a preliminary report on a survey
of nearly one thousand judges regarding their experiences with
unrepresented litigants. Sixty-two percent of all judges surveyed said the
outcomes are worse for litigants when they represent themselves. Those
judges cited the most common problem for litigants included, a failure to
present necessary evidence, procedural errors, ineffective witness
examination, and failure to properly object to evidence.106
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In theorizing why the presence of a lawyer matters, in addition to the
formal knowledge of law and the procedural rules of litigation, Sandefur
proposes that the act of lawyering itself helps the client translate their
problem into a solution through a process of diagnosis, inference, and
treatment.107 For example, in a child custody dispute, there is a need to
separate the emotional response from the legal concepts and to
constructively respond using the professional tools available with
intellectual detachment. Sandefur calls this “the ability to distance oneself
from the human mess of people’s problems and to identify the stakes, risks,
and benefits of alternative courses of action.”108 Certainly, the inability of
Brenda King to distance herself from the potential impacts and the risk of
loss to her and her children, as well as her inability to conform to procedural
and evidentiary rules, both contributed to her inability to effectively
advocate for her own interests.
Another theory is more subjective. Sandefur reports that the studies
examining outcome disparities in cases between litigants with
representation and those without indicate that the mere presence of an
attorney representing a client can affect the judge’s perception of the merits
of the case and, thus, can predict the outcome.109 While certainly not
conclusive and in no way covering the field of potential research of the
issues, these studies, nevertheless, present another possible dilemma for
litigants who lack representation. The largest differences in outcomes occur
in cases impacting basic needs and fundamental rights, including landlordtenant cases, asylum cases, and social security disability hearings.110
Sandefur speculates that the disparity is greatest in these and other types of
disputes that particularly involve concerns impacting low-income persons
because these litigants frequently experience double or even triple stigmas,
such as poverty, disability, limited education, limited English language
proficiency, or immigrant status.111 Thus, lawyer representation in cases
involving “lower status parties” may act as an endorsement of the client and
the client’s cause, which affects how judges and other court staff treat the

VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010

29

30

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

client and evaluate the client’s claims. That is, judges and court staff believe
that the lawyer-represented cases are more likely to be meritorious and,
therefore, view the facts in this light, regardless of how they are
presented.112 Whether this “belief” was also an unconscious factor in the
King decision must be left to conjecture.113

VIII. RIGHT TO COUNSEL DEVELOPMENTS POST-KING
So where does the King decision leave those who seek equal justice for
all? What does it mean for those who believe that a core principle of the
fundamental right of access to courts is the right to have a lawyer advocate
for one’s interests when basic human needs or fundamental rights are at
stake? Given the breadth of the court’s decision in King and the short shrift
given to a contextual basis for considering appointment of counsel, it is
unlikely that the Washington Supreme Court will soon revisit the issue in
any case involving a “purely private matter initiated by the parties.”
However, pursuing the right in other contexts is not foreclosed—
particularly those contexts in which matters of public interest are involved,
or in which a governmental actor either initiates the action or is inextricably
entwined in the proceedings.
As discussed above, two cases are currently pending before the
Washington Supreme Court on whether children are entitled to be
represented by counsel: first, in truancy proceedings brought by a school
district;114 and second, in proceedings brought by the state to terminate
parental rights.115 These cases may provide the opportunity for the court to
carve out children as a special category for protection, given their minority,
their lack of voice in processes that impact them directly, and the long-term
implication for matters that affect fundamental rights, such as education,
physical liberty, and familial relationship. Moreover, in each case, the
power of the state is brought to bear on the child or interest at issue. In the
truancy petition, the legal action is taken against the child as the named
respondent who, after being hailed into court, is interrogated by the judge
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presiding over the case without being given any adult assistance. The
subsequent court order also operates directly against the child. If the court
enters an order compelling the child to attend school and the child fails to
comply with the order, the child could be held in contempt of court and
incarcerated for up to seven days.116 Thus, any violation of the order risks
deprivation of the child’s physical liberty.
Whether the court sees fit to find that a child is entitled to representation
in truancy cases may very well depend on whether the presence of a lawyer
matters. Representation by a lawyer for a child in truancy proceedings could
have a direct and beneficial impact on the outcome for the child. Efforts to
determine the reason why the child is not attending school and to provide
services to address the concern are both statutory preconditions to a child
being found “truant” by the court. Typically in truancy cases, the factfinding hearing lasts just a few minutes, and more frequently, the hearings
are not held at all. This is because the child is often pressured into agreeing
to enter a court order finding them truant and compelling the child’s school
attendance.117 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in virtually every case in
which an unrepresented student is brought before the court, the student is
found “truant” and subject to an order to attend school.118
The case of In re Dependency of A.R. and D.R.119 asks the court to
consider whether children are entitled to counsel in a different context—
when their interest in the parent-child relationship is at stake in parental
rights termination proceedings. This context varies from the truancy
proceeding in several respects. For example, though the action is initiated
by the state, it is not brought directly against the child. Rather, the state
arguably pursues the action “in the best interests of the child.”120 The
child’s interests are represented by an independent advocate, a guardian ad
litem (GAL), who may or may not be an attorney. However, because the
GAL is not obligated to take direction from the child at issue, the presence
of a GAL does not necessarily give a “voice” to the child in court.121
Finally, how a lawyer can affect the outcome of the parental rights
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termination process may be less clear in the termination context than in the
truancy case. In a termination proceeding, the state has the burden of
establishing that specific statutory criteria have been met;122 once it has
done so, the court is authorized to terminate the parental rights. There is
little flexibility in the criteria, and the desires of the child are not a statutory
factor. Moreover, the child often has little knowledge or information to
bring to bear on the statutory criteria. Nevertheless, the child’s “best
interest” or desire can influence how the court interprets the other criteria
and, ultimately, the outcome.
Indeed, there are strong reasons related to the child’s emotional,
psychological, or physical health that could influence the process and result
in a conclusion that, even though the statutory facts have been met and the
parents are not able to resume care of the child, the parent-child bond
should not be severed.123 In the absence of a lawyer for the child, however,
the court relies on the state and the GAL to inform the court of these
concerns, and consequently, the child’s “voice” may never be heard.124
Given the fundamental nature of the interest at stake and the precedent of
the Myricks/Luscier cases, in which Washington first adopted a right to
counsel for parents in juvenile court termination and dependency
proceedings, there is strong basis for the court to extend the right to children
as well.125
How the court resolves the question of counsel in each of these cases
currently remains to be seen. The court could potentially recognize a right
to counsel in both cases, in neither case, or in one case and not the other,
and in doing so, may cite any number of differences in the proceedings.
These include the differing interests at stake, the varying complexity of the
proceedings, the impact of a lawyer on the outcome for the child, the nature
of the potential outcome of the case (e.g., change in a child’s placement
versus potential incarceration), or the representation by a GAL in the
termination proceeding versus lack of an advocate at all in the truancy
proceeding. The court could also rule in both the termination and truancy
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contexts that children should be entitled to representation by skilled
counsel, separate and apart from the GAL role, in any adversarial
proceeding in which their basic needs or fundamental rights are at stake.126
This ruling could be based solely on their status as children, as persons in
their own right, with their own unique and constitutionally-protected
interests, but without the capacity or skill to represent themselves in
court.127
Recently decided by the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II,
Dependency of E.H. raised the question of an indigent parent’s right to
counsel at public expense in an otherwise private custody proceeding when
the state is inextricably entangled in the case and directly interested in the
outcome.128 Dependency of E.H. involved a foster parent who sought
custody of a child who had been a dependent ward of the juvenile court for
five years. Each biological parent, separately and to varying degrees, made
significant strides in recent years to address the problems that initially
caused the state to intervene to protect the child.129 Rather than seek to
terminate the parent-child relationship and to avoid the continuation of
efforts to reunite the child with the parents, the state affirmatively
encouraged the child’s foster parent to seek custody as the recommended
permanent plan for the child’s care.130 The third-party, nonparental custody
proceeding was filed as a separate action from the juvenile court
dependency.131 The juvenile court then authorized the proceeding to go
forward in the usual course through the county court’s general civil
division.132
The mother disputed that nonparental custody was appropriate and
continued to ask for the child’s return to her care, but she would have been
left to show why she should be reunited with her child without an attorney
at her side. Under the nonparental custody statutes, there is no expressed
right to appointed counsel for indigent parents.133 However, in the juvenile
court dependency process, indigent parents are entitled to counsel at public
expense for “all stages” of the dependency process.134 Thus, the appellate
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court had to decide whether the right to counsel extends to the family court
custody proceedings when they are initiated as an integral part of the
juvenile court dependency case.
The court of appeals found that the nonparental custody action was
“inextricably linked” with the dependency issue of whether the child should
be returned to either parent’s home.135 Therefore, the court concluded that
because there is a statutory right to counsel at all stages of the dependency
process, it necessarily follows that the right to counsel attaches to the
collateral, nonparental custody proceeding initiated pursuant to the
permanency-planning phase of the dependency process.136
Even though the nonparental custody proceeding in Dependency of E.H.
was brought by a private party, the King decision did not foreclose a ruling
that the parent has a right to counsel in a custody case. Unlike in King, the
state was directly involved in Dependency of E.H.—both as the child’s
lawful custodian under the dependency court process and as the facilitator
and advocate of the permanent plan. Arguably, counsel is even more critical
for the parent in the nonparental custody proceeding because the statutory
standards for nonparental custody are factually based, harder to meet, relate
primarily to the fitness of the parent, and are only secondarily related to the
best interests of the child.137 The parents’ ability to present evidence,
examine witnesses (including experts), and to present themselves in the best
light is absolutely critical to the outcome. When 62 percent of judges
responding to a survey say that unrepresented parties are negatively
impacted by lack of representation,138 the need for a lawyer to represent a
parent in a nonparental custody case is apparent and essential to protect the
parties and the court from an erroneous outcome—one that may have
serious long-term consequences for the child.
In addition to the continuing efforts to gain recognition of the right to
counsel as opportunistic cases come before courts, several developments are
underway nationally to explore avenues for implementing the rights in cases
involving basic human needs or fundamental rights. As discussed above, as
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part of the ABA’s continuing leadership on the issue, a Presidential Task
Force worked to develop a Statement of Basic Principles of a Right to
Counsel in Civil Proceedings139 and a Model Access Act140 to encourage
implementation. These documents convey a sense of urgency and purpose
among mainstream support for the equal justice cause not seen since the
early 1960s and the aftermath of the newly-recognized right to criminal
counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.141 This sense of urgency and purpose is
also propelling the development of pilot projects142 to demonstrate and
evaluate both the beneficial impacts of counsel in civil cases and the cost
savings that might be achieved through providing counsel to indigent
litigants as a matter of right when basic human needs are at stake.143
Furthermore, legislation to increase access to representation for indigents
has been adopted in California in the Shriver Basic Access Act.144 The
Shriver Act sets up a system that funds and delivers legal services that
ensure some level of legal assistance for all eligible persons in certain
categories of cases. The Act also requires representation for all indigent
persons in adversarial judicial proceedings involving basic human needs
and certain fundamental rights.145
Activities expressing support for a civil right to counsel when basic
human needs are at stake continue to garner attention in national and local
media and among advocates. The National Coalition for a Civil Right to
Counsel monitors the efforts and documents them through its public website.146 Locally, equal justice advocates continue to identify opportunities to
raise right to counsel issues in appropriate cases and are working through
programs like the Symposium sponsored by the Fred T. Korematsu Center
for Law and Equality and Washington’s three law schools.147 The advocates
actively participate in national efforts to study case outcomes and cost
impacts of lack of representation for indigent civil litigants, explore pilot
project opportunities, and continue to give visibility to the issue through
organized and coordinated efforts.148
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IX. CONCLUSION
There should be no question that representation by a skilled and
competent lawyer in an adversarial proceeding of any kind beneficially
affects the outcome for the party represented. While the research is limited,
recent evidence suggests that the lack of representation negatively impacts
not only an unrepresented party but also the decision making process in the
particular case149 and the courts, in general.150 Lawyers do matter, and
though it may be obvious, it is also borne out by research.
Because it is increasingly apparent that lack of representation is often
synonymous with lack of justice—despite the result in King—equal justice
advocates will continue to pursue the right of all persons to be represented
by competent counsel when their basic human needs and fundamental rights
are at stake. Some will pursue the right in regard to certain constitutionallycognizable interests, such as familial relationships; some on behalf of
particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, persons with disabilities,
and victims of domestic violence; some on a case-by-case basis when there
are particularly compelling facts; and some through legislative policy or
other nonjudicial forums. Then there are those advocates who will continue
to pursue the right whenever possible and through whatever vehicles are
available, regardless of which basic human need or fundamental interest is
at stake, or whatever classification of litigant may be at risk. The struggle
for the right to counsel will continue because it must—it is fundamental to
the cause of justice.
The King decision settles the question for the moment in the context of
Washington’s purely private custody proceedings. As disappointing as the
decision was to the cause of equal justice, it will not stand against the test of
time. The need is too great, the reasons are too compelling, and the
momentum toward change is too strong to be turned back.151 Advocates for
equal justice must continue to visualize the civil right to counsel as a core
value and assert it when basic human needs and fundamental rights are at
stake.152 That vision will continue to fuel the pursuit of equal justice work
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and, hopefully, inspire others as well. As the goal of equal justice is
visualized and opportunities for asserting the right to counsel in civil
proceedings arise, the King decision will be read and reread and its impacts
on justice evaluated. Thus, the legacy of King, if for no other reason, will be
that inquiring minds will ask, “if not now, when?”
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In recent years, then Chief Justice Gerry Alexander spoke often about the “justice
gap” and the need for more resources to meet the legal needs of low-income persons in
Washington. Justice Charles Johnson chaired a blue-ribbon Civil Justice Funding Task
Force, which from 2001–2004 carried out its assigned mission to secure state funding to
fully realize the principle that access to justice is a fundamental right. Other justices
similarly demonstrated strong commitment to the cause through various public
pronouncements and participation in activities devoted to this purpose. See Task Force on
Civil Equal Justice Final Report, TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING (June
2004), http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/?fa=newsinfo.internetdetail&newsid=459.
60
See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 n.29 (Wash. 2005).
61
See generally Myricks, 533 P.2d 841.
62
See generally Luscier, 524 P.2d 906.
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63

See generally Tetro, 544 P.2d 17.
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.53.010–2.52.900 (2005). See Memorandum from Jim
Bamberger, Director, Wash. State Office of Civil Legal Aid (Apr. 21, 2007 ) (on file with
author.).
65
While Justice Sanders concurred in the result, he wrote separately to assert that no
state action is implicated in the process of state court resolution of private disputes,
notwithstanding the long-standing holding of Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948), to
the contrary. Justice James Johnson joined Justice Sanders’ concurring opinion. Marriage
of King, 174 P.3d at 671. The rationale ignores the fact that it is the power of the state
court to compel enforcement of its orders that threatens the private interests at stake. For
example, in Tetro, 544 P.2d at 19–20, the court held that indigent litigants charged with
contempt are entitled to appointed counsel when facing incarceration.
66
The dissenters would have directly found a right to counsel in private
custody/”residential placement” proceedings in Washington:
64

The majority fails to appreciate the full extent of the liberty interest a parent
has in the relationship with his or her child, and erroneously concludes that
under the state constitution the right to counsel does not attach unless
termination of the parent-child relationship is at stake and the State is a party
to the action. I would hold that an independent constitutional analysis applies
in this context under the state due process clause, article I, section 3. In accord
with the principles enunciated in Luscier and Myricks, an indigent parent has a
due process right to appointed counsel at public expense in residential
placement proceedings involving child placement because a parent has a
liberty interest in his or her children at stake just as it is in termination
proceedings.
King, 174 P.3d at 681.
See id. at 669. SANFORD KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 1 (Oxford University Press
2003) (“It should be remembered that divorce in the United States, opposed by some
religions, was a taboo subject, and the status of a divorced person carried with it a social
stigma.”). Katz attributes the major changes in family law to the availability of
representation in divorce courts by legal services lawyers.
68
King, 174 P.3d at 661(emphasis added).
69
The reference to a “dissolution” proceeding versus a child custody proceeding both
minimizes the nature of what is at stake and insinuates a negative social connotation, e.g.,
divorce as anti-family preservation. The Washington Supreme Court’s view of marriage
as entitled to less constitutional protection than the parent-child relationship may be
inferred from its ruling in Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 969, 978 (Wash.
2006) (“The plaintiffs have not established that they are members of a suspect class or
that they have a fundamental right to marriage that includes the right to marry a person of
the same sex.”).
70
King, 174 P.3d at 661. While perhaps unintentional, even the inversion of the parties’
parental versus legal status in the case as “father-respondent” v. “petitioner-mother”
emphasizes the “father” status in the case over the legal status of the “petitioner.”
Contrast this to the dissent’s characterization of the trial court having “placed” the
67
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children with Mr. King and the negative impact on the mother’s relationship with the
children, observing that “When a child is removed from the parent’s home, thousands of
moments of interactions are lost.” Id. at 678 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
71
See id. at 661.
72
See id. at 661–62.
73
Id. at 663.
74
Id. at 662; see also Luscier, 524 P.2d 906; and Myrick, 533 P.2d 841 (holding that
deprivation or impairment of parental rights in juvenile court dependency proceedings
requires appointment of counsel at public expense for indigent parents); cf. Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that where no physical liberty is at
stake, no right to counsel is presumed unless overcome by analysis of the competing
interests at stake balanced against risk of error).
75
King, 174 P.3d at 663.
76
The majority noted that even when a parenting plan proceeding results in a child
spending substantially less or even no time with one parent, “both parents remain parents
and retain substantial rights, including the right to seek future modification of the
parenting plan.” King, 174 P.3d at 663. In fact, the statute that governs the modification
of a parenting plan, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (2008), creates a very high standard
and burden of proof for modifying a plan once in place. Hence, the “right” to seek future
modification provides little comfort to a parent-litigant in the first instance. In this case,
Brenda King did successfully get the parenting plan modified after she was able to get
pro bono counsel and due to changes in the father’s circumstances.
77
King, 174 P.3d at 662.
78
Id. at 663. The majority’s formulation of the interest at stake erroneously collapses
two concepts: (1) the nature of the interest, and (2) the process that is due. There is no
question that the interest at stake for Brenda King was protection of her parent-child
relationship, an interest that has long been deemed fundamental by both the Washington
and U.S. Supreme Courts. The majority’s analysis failed to differentiate between the
substantive due process rights of parents in the care, custody and control of their child
(see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)) and the scope of potential deprivation at
issue in a parenting plan dispute, which more logically resulted in the interest being
afforded less protection than in the Myricks/Luscier cases. By confusing the analysis, the
majority left the unfortunate impression that the substantive due process rights that inhere
in the parent-child relationship are less fundamental post-King, e.g., “[T]he petitioner’s
fundamental liberty interest is not at stake here.” King, 174 P.3d at 667. It is unclear if the
court intended to carve out less substantive protection for parents in Washington and it
seems inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, as
well as the Washington Supreme Court’s own recent decision in Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161. This may need to be clarified in later cases.
79
King, 174 P.3d at 664 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002, et. seq.) The majority
identifies the following as “safeguards”: the statutory focus on the “best interests of the
child” (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002); the court’s authority to appoint an attorney to
represent the child’s interests (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.110); a court’s ability to seek
the advice of a professional (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.210); the court’s authority to
appoint a guardian ad litem for the children (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.220); the
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provision of court facilitators for unified family courts (WASH. REV. CODE §
26.12.802(3)(d)); and, authority to shift expenses of attorneys to the opposing party.
(WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.140)). The majority also cites the parent’s ability to seek
modification of a parenting plan once entered as a basis for distinguishing the impairment
of parental rights in a dependency/termination case versus what occurs in a parenting
plan action between two parents. King, 174 P.3d at 663. However, modification of
parenting plans is disfavored under Washington law and WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260
imposes strict requirements. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pape, 989 P.2d 1120, 1128–29
(1999).
80
See generally Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, In re
Marriage of King, (Snohomish Cty Court No. 04-3-02385-0).
81
Brief for Nw. Women’s Law Ctr. As Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 12–15, In
re Marriage of King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007) (No. 77987-4) (COA 57831-6).
82
See King, 174 P.3d at 674–75.
83
Id. at 663.
84
Id. at 664 (“Though we determine that fundamental constitutional rights are not
implicated in a dissolution proceeding, we address the petitioner’s constitutional claims.
The interests, while not fundamental, are significant enough to analyze the constitutional
claims.”). It is impossible to read the majority decision as anything other than ambiguous
with respect to what interests are included as “significant.” The majority goes on to
analyze the constitutional claims (i.e., right of access to courts, state privileges and
immunities, and federal due process and equal protection) in a logic vacuum created by
the absence of an identified protectable fundamental right in the purely private parentchild relationship.
85
See id. (citing Wash. Const. art. I, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered
openly, and without unnecessary delay.”)). Washington’s “open courts” mandate is often
cited as the basis for the right of access to courts.
86
Bullock v. Roberts, 524 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1974) (stating that it is within the
inherent power of the court to make such orders as are necessary to enable the poor to
access the judicial system).
87
While the physical facility was a barrier that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed in
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (holding that meaningful access to courts is
an integral component of due process), the Lane Court did not limit its reasoning to
physical barriers. Indeed, under both federal and state disability law, courts must
reasonably accommodate litigants with non-physical disabilities to the same extent they
must accommodate litigants with physical disabilities. See, e.g., WASH. GEN. R. 33.
88
Wash. Const. art. I, § 3 (2008); Wash. Const. art. I, § 12 (2008).
89
See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (factors in analysis include “(1)
The textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4)
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local
concern.”).
90
See King, 174 P.3d at 667.
91
See id.
92
See id. at 668.
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93

See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979). More recently, the Maryland
Supreme Court refused to take the opportunity when presented to similarly consider the
question under the Maryland Constitution. However, three of the judges in that case
would have taken up the issue and would have found that a right to counsel existed for
the indigent mother-appellant in a private custody case. See Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d
114 (Md. 2003) (Cathell, J. concurring).
94
Compare Luscier, 524 P.2d 906 and Myricks, 533 P.2d 841 with Lassiter, 452 U.S. at
25–26 (U.S. Supreme Court holding that there is not a mandatory right to counsel for
parents in termination proceedings under the federal constitution.).
95
See Wash. Const. art. I, § 12 (“[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of
citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”) The intent of the
provision is to prevent the state from affording special rights or privileges to certain
classes to the detriment of all other citizens.
96
See Brief of Appellant at 41, In re Marriage of King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. Aug. 10,
2006) (No. 77981-4), (COA No. 57831-6) (citing State v. Vance, 70 P. 34, 41 (Wash.
1902) (stating that the “usual remedies . . . to enforce . . . personal rights” are a
“privilege”)).
97
See Brief of Appellant at 42, In re Marriage of King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. Aug. 10,
2006) (No. 77981-4), (COA No. 57831-6).
98
King, 174 P.3d at 669.
99
Brenda King also asked the court to interpret the Washington constitutional provision
in light of “fundamental principles” as required by Wash. Const. art. I, § 32. Wash.
Const. art. I, § 32 (“A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government.”) The fundamental
principles at issue are those of fairness and justice and that all persons are equal before
the law. The right to counsel effectuates these purposes in a civil context no less so than
in a criminal context. The State as an Involved Party in King, so much as conceded the
point. See Brief of Involved Party State of Washington by Snohomish County at 30,
King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. Apr. 19, 2007) (No. 57831-6) (“With all due respect to the
criminal defense bar, dissolution cases involving children are completely different,
require different skills, and are in many ways more complex.”). The majority found no
guidance in art. I, § 32 because “Ms. King identifies no natural right, in existence at the
time of the constitution, to appointed counsel.” King, 174 P.3d at 667 n.14.
100
See id. at 679 (citing ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ET AL., PRIVATE ORDERING REVISITED:
WHAT CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE PARENTS NEGOTIATING?, IN DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., Yale Univ. Press
1990)).
101
Laws 1987, c 469, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181 (2010), et.seq.
102
King, 174 P.3d at 679 (citing Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional
Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal
Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 132 (1990)).
103
For a very recent exploration and review of the existing research on lawyer-affected
outcomes in litigation, see Engler, supra note 12. Engler reviews research data for both
cases involving lawyer representation and cases in which a litigant received some self-
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help assistance by either a lawyer or a lay advocate. He concludes that the data is clear
that favorable outcomes for represented versus unrepresented litigants are statistically
significant. However, the data is less clear for unrepresented persons who receive some
self-help assistance from a lawyer or a lay advocate, even though persons who use such
services report a relatively high level of satisfaction with the justice system. Thus, while
education and de-mystification of the justice system seems to promote trust and
confidence in the system for those who are otherwise unrepresented, obtaining favorable
or as favorable outcomes that they might achieve with representation seems elusive. See
also Carroll Seron, et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 419, 428–29 (2001) (finding significant disparities in case outcomes between
parties represented by counsel and parties without counsel on the basis of a randomized
study of representation in housing courts.). To date, the Seron study is the only reported
randomized study of impacts of representation by counsel and remains the leading
scientific contribution to the debate from the perspective of the litigant.
104
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, LAWYERS’ IMPACT ON CIVIL TRIAL AND HEARING
OUTCOMES (forthcoming) (manuscript at 24) (on file with author) [hereinafter LAWYERS
IMPACT]. See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: an Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51 (2010) [hereinafter Impact of Counsel] and
references cited therein for further discussion of the research and findings.
105
See LAWYERS’ IMPACT, supra note 104, manuscript at 29.
106
See Coalition on Justice, supra note 8; see Coalition on Justice, supra note 9 and 10
107
See LAYWERS’ IMPACT, supra note 104, at 6.
108
Id.
109
See id.
110
Sandefur, supra note 105, at 30.
111
See id.
112
See id. Sandefur writes, “[I]n the barest sense: the presence of any lawyer, as opposed
to no lawyer at all, signals something important about a case to the other people involved
in processing it. The presence of a lawyer on one’s case would then lead to a kind of
symbolic relational expertise. Ironically, to the extent that this is an important mechanism
creating lawyers’ impact, that impact would be obviated by universal representation, as
the presence of an attorney per se would no longer signal anything to [a court].” Id. at 30.
113
The fact that Brenda King raised no error with respect to the merits of the trial court
decision, choosing to focus instead solely on the absence of counsel, may have
unwittingly created the impression that the merits of her claim to be the primary
residential parent were so weak that the presence of a lawyer would not have changed the
outcome. As noted above, this proved to be untrue as she regained primary care of the
children subsequently.
114
See Bellevue Sch. Dist., 199 P.3d at 1011 (holding that children alleged to be truant
under WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.225.020 (2008) are entitled to appointed counsel), rev.
granted, 210 P.3d 1018 (Wash. 2009).
115
In re the Termination of D.R. and A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. filed Jan. 27, 2010).
116
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.225.010–28A.225.020 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.225.090(2) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(e) (2008).
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117

See Brief for TeamChild and Committee for Indigent Representation and Civil Legal
Equality as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 14–16., Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S.,
199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (No. 605283).
118
Id.
119
See In re the Termination of D.R. and A.R., No. 84132-2 (Wash. filed Jan. 27, 2010).
120
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.132 (2008).
121
Under WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100 (2010), a guardian ad litem is appointed in
juvenile court dependency and termination proceedings to represent the “best interests of
the child,” but not necessarily to ascertain and advocate for the child’s articulated
interest, position, or desired outcome for the case.
122
See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.132. (2008).
123
Some studies have concluded that regardless of the parent’s ability to care for the
child, the child’s interest in knowing who his or her parents are and being connected to
them at any level is better for the child psychologically and emotionally than not
maintaining the relationship, even if only as a matter of law.
124
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.100(6) (2008) provides discretionary authority to juvenile
courts to appoint counsel for a child age twelve or older. Some counties in Washington,
notably King, routinely appoint counsel to children age twelve or older upon request,
while others rarely do so. A recent amendment to the statute requires the state and
guardian ad litem to notify children age twelve and older of their right to request counsel.
H.B. 2735, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010).
125
Interestingly, children in Washington State who seek to reinstate a parent-child
relationship which a juvenile court has terminated have a right to counsel at public
expense. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(3) (2010).
126
This basis is suggested by another recently adopted ABA policy statement, which
urges that states provide counsel to children and/or youth at all stages of status offense
proceedings, including truancy, as a matter of right and at public expense. See American
Bar Ass’n, Legal Counsel for Children, ABANOW.ORG, www.abanow.org/2010/07/am2010-109a.
127
For example, in a recent case, an Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that a juvenile
defendant in a civil domestic violence protection order proceeding is entitled to counsel
as a matter of due process because the child is effectively unable to represent themselves.
See Leone v. Owen, No. OT-09-019, 2010 WL 1730146 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
(“Appellants young age alone would indicate that he should have been appointed counsel.
Furthermore, the informal nature of the civil protection hearings exacerbates the problem
of permitting juveniles to proceed pro se.”)
128
Dependency of E.H., 243 P.3d 160 (2010).
129
See Dependency of E.H., 243 P.3d at 161.
130
See id. 243 P.3d at 162.
131
See id.
132
See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030 (2003) (authorizing nonparental custody
proceedings). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.155 (2009) (authorizing juvenile
courts to either hear a nonparental custody proceeding directly or grant concurrent
jurisdiction to the general division of the superior courts to determine the merits of a nonparent’s petition for custody of a child.).
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See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.10.010–26.10.912. (1987).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.090 (2010); see also Grove, 897 P.2d 1252 (holding
that when there is a statutory right to counsel there is a right to counsel at all stages of the
proceedings).
135
Dependency of E.H., 243 P.3d at 165.
136
See id.
137
See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030 (2003).
138
Preliminary Report on Survey of Judges, supra note 8, at 11.
139
See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 15, at 7–8.
140
See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 16. See also American Bar Ass’n, supra note
127 (urging right to counsel for all children in status offense cases).
141
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
142
Pilot projects have been developed and implemented in Boston in housing and
guardianship cases and in Texas to provide for counsel as a matter of right in tenant
eviction defense and foreclosure cases. The Boston Bar Foundation and the
Massachusetts Bar Foundation provided a combined total funding of $385,000 to
implement the Boston pilots in two sites for eighteen months. Texas pilot projects were
funded by the Texas Access to Justice Foundation for eighteen months each at a proposed
cost of $310,000 and $347,000, respectively. A pilot project on providing counsel for
mortgage foreclosure diversion and mediation is under consideration in Philadelphia and
other parts of Pennsylvania. Finally, as part of the Shriver Basic Access to Justice Act,
pilot projects are being developed in California to provide counsel as a matter of right in
certain basic needs cases, with the goal of evaluating the most effective methods for
further implementation. See Equal Access to Justice Act, POVERTYLAW.ORG,
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/category.html?catid:int=2010400.
143
See e.g., Abel, supra note 12.
144
AB 590, Cal. State Leg., Chapter 457 (2009). The Shriver Basic Access to Justice Act
appropriates funds for the development of pilot projects in eight California locations to
provide counsel as matter of right in certain basic needs cases, with the goal of evaluating
the most effective methods for further implementation.
145
See id.
146
See http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
147
See Seattle University School of Law Symposium, supra note 12.
148
See also Access to Justice Board, Plan for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid to Low
Income People in Washington State, WSBA.ORG 24 (May 8, 2006),
http://www.wsba.org/atj/documents/2006stateplan.pdf. Washington’s State Plan for
Delivery of Civil Legal Aid, a “blue print” for the development and implementation of
delivery system goals and structures, which was adopted by and is periodically reviewed
by the State Access to Justice Board. See id. The State Plan commits to efforts to
establish a right to counsel to fill the gaps in services available through the civil legal aid
system. See id.
149
See Coalition for Justice, supra note 8, at 13. (finding “42 percent of judges are
concerned that they compromise the impartiality of the court in order to prevent
injustice.”).
134
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See id. at 12, 14 (“Seventy-one percent (71%) of the judges [responding to the survey]
are concerned by the time staff must use to assist self-represented persons”;…The
overwhelming consensus at 86 [percent] is that the courts would be more efficient if both
parties were represented. Contrary to the popular belief that lawyers slow the wheels of
justice, the court views advocates as an efficiency of the adversarial system.”).
151
See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 13; American Bar Ass’n, supra note 14;
American Bar Ass’n, supra note 15; American Bar Ass’n, supra note 16; DAILY
JOURNAL, supra note 17; and Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, Assem. B. 590, 2009
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
152
See Deborah Perluss, Keeping the Eyes on the Prize: Visualizing the Civil Right to
Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 719 (2006).
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